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1. Introduction
Technology and legal rules are bound to coeveolve. Early examples of technology that im-
pacted the legal system are steamboats and railroads. They brought up a variety of un-
precedented cases and placed novel demands on the law. Steamboats proved risky because
of res from sparks and boilers explosions, leading eventually to the responsibility for steam-
boat owners and captains to prove non negligent behavior in case of litigation (Khan, 2004).
Liability rules were also challenged by railroads because of sparks on crop and incredibly
numerous injuries and fatalities (Ely, 2001).
The American system of copyright law system also experienced changes because of tech-
nological innovation: \Copyright decisions illustrate how adjudication by analogy economized
on the costs of technological transitions. Still, many of the technological innovations of the
nineteenth century (photography) were suciently dierent from existing technologies as to
make judicial analogies somewhat strained, and ultimately required accommodation by the leg-
islature instead" (Khan, 2004, p. 20). Even more recent innovations posed similar worries,
for instance in the 80's it was not clear whether computer source code could be considered
literary works for the purposes of copyright law (Bennett Moses, 2003).1
Other technological advances that also demanded legal innovation include medicine (e.g.,
in vitro fertilization and genetic testing), automobiles, computing, and communication (e.g.,
telegraphy and, more recently, the internet).2
This paper analyzes the link between legal institutions, innovation and growth. In partic-
ular, it investigates how legal institutions deal with the challenges presented by technological
innovation. In its relationship with technological change, a legal system faces (at least) two
challenges. First, since new technologies may require dierent legal rules, a legal system
must adapt to changing conditions. Second, to the extent that the legal framework aects
the investment climate, a legal system should also be judged by its capacity to provide in-
centives to innovate.3 For instance, an adaptable legal system is of no use in the absence
1The development of the right to privacy is another interesting illustration of a new legal concept meant to
cope with the (negative) externalities following the adoption of new technologies such as photography (Khan,
2004).
2See Khan (2004) and Friedman (2002) for a discussion of how the US legal institutions responded to
various examples of technological innovation.
3The importance of the legal and regulatory frameworks on investment (and innovation) strongly emerges
from the Investment Climate Surveys recently launched by the World Bank.Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 2
of change. To address these issues, we analyze a stylized model of endogenous technological
progress. More specically, as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) we consider a model where
innovations improve the quality of existing products and make old products obsolete.4 In
the context of our model, the amount of R&D investment (and, consequently, the probability
that new technologies are discovered) depends on the law expected in the new technological
environment.
We study two legal systems: a rigid regime and a exible regime. The two regimes dier
with respect to their ability to adapt to changing conditions. The reason why we focus on
this particular distinction is twofold. First, at least since Posner (1973) exibility is usually
regarded as a key feature that dierentiates Common Law from Civil Law.5 Second, recent
empirical work (namely, Beck et al., 2003) has provided some evidence that the adaptability
of Case Law partly explains some of the benets of Common Law for nancial and other
variables.6
This paper assumes that in the rigid legal system, courts or regulators have no discretion
and are bound to enforce the existing rule (statute or administrative regulation). Statutes and
regulations are written ex-ante, before knowing the technology that will prevail. Following
the incomplete contract literature (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986, and Hart and Moore,
1990) we assume that ex ante it is not possible to describe accurately future contingencies, so
that in the rigid regime the existing rule is assumed to be non-contingent. In other words, the
same law is applied in all technological environments.7 In our model of the rigid regime we
also assume that the legislator (or regulator) understands how the law aects the incentives
to innovate and knows the payo consequences of the law in each technological environment.8
4In the growth literature, quality-improving innovations are known as \vertical" innovations. Aghion and
Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) are the seminal papers on growth with vertical innovation.
See Romer (1987, 1990) for growth models where innovation is horizontal (i.e., innovators expand the variety
of available goods).
5As argued in Beck and Levine (2005), \legal systems that embrace case law and judicial discretion tend to
adapt more eciently to changing conditions than legal systems that adhere rigidly to formalistic procedures
and that rely more strictly on judgements based narrowly on statutory law."
6Beck et al. (2003) construct a measure of adaptability of the legal system that takes into account whether
judicial decisions are based on previous court decisions and on principles of equity rather than on statutory
law. Their measure uses data from Djankov et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (2004).
7In Section 4.4 below we weaken this assumption and consider the possibility that the statute or regulation
can be changed at a cost.
8Similarly, the incomplete contract literature assumes that the contracting parties cannot write a fully-
contingent contract but they correctly anticipate the consequences of their actions in all future states of theAnderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 3
In the exible legal regime courts and regulators are assumed to have discretion and choose
the law ex post, after observing the current state of the technology. The law is therefore
state-contingent.
Leaving discretion ex post seems a sensible choice, especially in periods of rapid and ongo-
ing technological change. Are there instances where the lack of exibility of the rigid regime
is preferable? The answer is \yes" since in our model law-makers suer from credibility prob-
lems: the ex-ante optimal law, which is the law that provides better incentives to innovate,
is not always optimal ex-post, once innovation has taken place. The rigid regime does not
suer from commitment problems because rules, which law-enforcers are bound to follow, are
written ex ante. However, as discussed above, the drawback of the rigid regime is that it is
ill-suited to changing conditions because the statute (or regulation) prescribes the same law
in all contingencies.
For example, in their survey of the development of intellectual property institutions in
the US, Khan and Sokolo (2001) hint at the role played by the legal system in reinforcing
the eectiveness of the patent system. They provide a clear example underlying the possible
advantages of (ex ante) certainty and lack of exibility in shaping the incentives to innovate.9
It is then apparent that the choice between the two legal systems involves a trade-o
between commitment and exibility. In this paper, we argue that the terms of this trade-o
change over time as technology matures. Consequently, legal institutions that are appropriate
in the early stages of technological development may no longer be preferable.
Needless to say, the trade-o between commitment and exibility (in other words, be-
tween rules and discretion) has long been studied in macroeconomics. However, we want to
emphasize one important point of distinction from the rule-versus-discretion literature. This
literature assumes that the degree of uncertainty, which is the crucial parameter to evaluate
the trade-o, is exogenous.10 Instead, in this paper the degree of uncertainty (which is related
world.
9Specically, treating the introduction of the 1836 Patent Act they write that: \The previous registration
system, modeled on British practices, had left issues of novelty and validity or appropriate scope in patent
applications to be resolved through civil actions, which proved to be an inecient way of resolving competing
claims. [...] The change led to a substantial increase in the potential returns to inventive activity." (Khan
and Sokolo 2001, p. 236).
10For example, Rogo (1985) compares rigid targeting systems and exible monetary regimes. The key
parameter in his comparison is the variance of aggregate productivity shocks: intuitively, rigid regimes are
preferable if uncertainty is low. More recently, Amador et al. (2006) study the optimal trade-o betweenLegal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 4
to the speed of technological change) is endogenous (via R&D investment) and depends on
the chosen rule.
The assumption that legal rules (laws) are incomplete (that is, not contingent on the
realized state) and that the underlying uncertainty is endogenous have important implications
in our model of the rigid regime. For example, consider the problem of a legislator who has
to write a non-contingent law before knowing whether or not the status-quo technology will
be replaced by a more advanced technology. When the likelihood of discovering the new
technology is either very low or very high, the incompleteness constraint that the legislator
faces in the rigid regime matters less: in either case, the legislator will simply select the rule
that optimally regulates the most likely state. Since the probability of replacing the status-
quo technology depends on the law that is selected ex ante and since a rigid system has a
comparative advantage in a certain environment (where the incompleteness constraint matters
less), the legislator has an incentive to choose a law that reduces the underlying uncertainty in
the economy. In particular, he may end up selecting a rule that either discourages or, more
surprisingly, strongly encourages R&D investment. The result is that the rate of growth
in a rule-based system is either very low or excessive (greater than rst-best). Conversely,
overinvestment in R&D never occurs when legal institutions are exible.
The goal of this paper is to study which legal system is better suited to maximize welfare.
In the context of a simple model with only two technological states, we show that exible
legal systems dominate (in terms of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth) in
economies at intermediate stages of technological development, these are periods when legal
change is needed. Instead, rigid legal systems are preferable at the early stages of technological
development, when commitment problems are more severe. Indeed, at the early stages of
development considerations about consumers' health and safety are more likely to matter.
Since R&D rms correctly foresee that in the exible regime law-makers will heavily regulate
ex-post, investment in research is suboptimally low and the old, inecient, technology is
likely to survive. Finally, we show that when technology is mature, the two legal systems
lead to the same economic outcomes.
commitment and exibility in an intertemporal consumption/savings model with time inconsistent preferences
and show that the optimal amount of exibility depends negatively on the degree of disagreement (which
measures the severity of the commitment problem) relative to the dispersion of taste shocks. In both papers
the degree of uncertainty is exogenously given.Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey discuss the related literature.
In Section 3 we present the basic model with two possible technologies and characterize the
optimal laws for each technology. Section 4 compares the rigid and exible regimes. Section 5
analyzes a dynamic model where technology undergoes continuous change and derive similar
results to the ones obtained in the basic model. In the stationary equilibrium of the rigid
regime the speed of technological change is either very low or very high. In the exible regime,
because of lack of commitment, investment in R&D is especially low at the early stages of
technological development. Section 6 concludes. For ease of exposition all proofs are in the
Appendix.
2. Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, Anderlini et al. (2011) is the rst paper to consider time-
inconsistency problems in judicial decision making. That paper considers a model of Case
Law in which the judges suer from an ex-post temptation to be excessively lenient that
stems from the fact that all economic decisions are sunk by the time the parties go to court.
In this set up, there is a specic role for the rule of precedent (stare decisis).
There is a sequence of cases, each considered by a forward-looking court in a parallel
sequence. Precedents, with some probability, bind the decisions of future courts, thus mit-
igating their tendency towards excessive leniency. Since each court can aect the state of
precedents via its current decision, this creates an incentive for the current court, even though
it rules ex-post, to avoid ex-ante ineciently lenient decisions. The thrust of Anderlini et al.
(2011) is to characterize the optimal trade-o created by these incentives. The state variable
there is the current \state of precedents," while here it is the current state of technology.
Kaplow (1992) is a fundamental and wide-scoped work on the economics of \rules versus
standards" rooted in the scholarly tradition of law. A rule is a law with an ex-ante prescription
(it has ex-ante \content") while a standard only acquires \content" ex-post.11 The back-bone
of the analysis in Kaplow (1992) is the study of the trade-os that (normatively) drive the
choice between rules and standards as they apply to the economic sphere. While he explores
many variations and extensions of the basic set-up, the main trade-o he identies is due
to the fact that rules are more expensive to formulate ex-ante, while standards are more
11As a example, a rule might prescribe that is it forbidden to drive \over 55 miles per hour," while a
standard would forbid \excessive speed." See Kaplow (1992), p. 560.Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 6
expensive to interpret (and hence enforce) ex-post. As a result, an important consideration
in the choice of a rule versus a standard is the frequency with which it will be invoked, and
the heterogeneity of the pool of situations to be considered.
Comin and Hobijn (2009) analyze a model of lobbying and technology adoption and argue
that countries where the legislative authorities have more exibility, the judicial system is
not eective, or the regime is not very democratic, new technologies replace old technologies
more slowly. This happens because rigidity in lawmaking makes lobbying for protecting the
old technology more dicult. The mechanism that explains why in their paper a rigid system
may favor technological progress relatively to a exible system is completely dierent from
ours. In our model, the channel is twofold. First, exibility may harm technological progress
because of time consistency problems. This explains why law-makers in a exible system
may choose ex-post a law that is less favorable to inventors than the one in the rst-best
solution. Second, for the reasons explained above rigid systems may choose a law that is
more favorable to investors compared to the rst-best solution.
Similarly to this paper, Acemoglu et al. (2006) argue that the policies that increase
growth in the early stages of development may be suboptimal at later stages. In particular,
they formalize the Gerschenkron's (1962) view that relatively backward economies should
pursue an investment-based strategy, which relies on long-term (hence, rigid) relationships
between entrepreneurs and nanciers and on a less competitive environment. However, as
the economy approaches the world technology frontier, they argue that countries should
switch to an innovation-based strategy, which requires more short-term (hence, more exible)
relationships, better selection of rms and managers and more competitive policies.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) study the relationship between contractual incompleteness, tech-
nological complementarities, and technology adoption. In their model, a rm chooses its
technology and investment levels in contractible activities with suppliers of intermediate in-
puts. Suppliers then choose investments in noncontractible activities, anticipating payos
from an ex post bargaining game. Their paper argues that greater contractual incomplete-
ness leads to the adoption of less advanced technologies, and that the impact of contractual
incompleteness is more pronounced when there is greater complementarity among the inter-
mediate inputs.12
12See also Acemoglu (2009, p. 801) for a discussion of the possibility of an hold-up problem in technologyAnderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 7
Finally, Immordino et al. (2011) analyze optimal policies when rms' research activity
leads to innovations that may be socially harmful. Public intervention, aecting the expected
protability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research and guide
the use of each innovation. In our setting we abstract from the enforcement problem, and we
judge the optimality of a legal system by studying the trade o between its adaptability to
technological change and its capacity to provide incentives to innovate.
Before moving on, we briey discuss the large legal literature that has studied the inter-
action between law and technology. More specically, various legal scholars have investigated
how legislation (a relatively inexible system) and common law adjudication (a relatively
exible system) deal with technological change.13 One of the main ndings of this literature
is that the main limitation of legislation is that rules, which are set in advance, likely suer
from either overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness. Conversely, being more gradual, com-
mon law adjudication may benet from society's experience with a technology. However, the
literature has also pointed out that legislation has several merits. Legislatures have greater
democratic legitimacy. Moreover, in drafting the law they can take a broader perspective
since, unlike courts, they do not focus on the case at hand. Furthermore, legislation can act
in advance and does not have to wait until the issue is litigated. As a result, it can act at
a stage where technology is still capable of being shaped and technology is not irrevocably
set.14
3. The Basic Model
As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), we consider a model of endogenous technological change
where new products provide greater quality than existing goods. The economy consists of
three sectors: the R&D sector, the intermediate good sector and the nal good sector. As
discussed below, we focus on the law that disciplines the production process of the interme-
diate good. To keep our setting tractable and focus attention on the interaction between
legal systems and innovation, our model of technological change is simplied along various
adoption.
13For instance, see Tribe (1973), Furrow (1982), Jasano (1995), Dworkin (1996), and Bennett Moses
(2003).
14It bears mentioning that the distinction between legislation and common law is often blurred: common
law has become less exible over time and, at the same time, legislatures are increasingly delegating to
administrative agencies in order to enhance exibility (Calabresi, 1982).Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 8
dimensions: for instance, the input prices in the R&D sector and in the intermediate good
sector are assumed to be exogenously given.
3.1. Technology and Market Structure
The nal good is produced competitively using the intermediate good. The production func-
tion of the nal good is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
y (i) = A(i)x(i)
1
2 ; (1)
where x(i) is the intermediate good and A(i) is a parameter that measures the productivity
of the intermediate good. To keep matters simple, we assume that the output elasticity with
respect to x(i) is 1=2.15 The index i 2 f0;1g denotes the state of technology sophistication
of the intermediate good which is available in the current period.16 Technology 0 is assumed
to be strictly less productive than technology 1: that is, A(1) = AA(0); with A > 1. The
invention process (which will be described shortly) is stochastic. In particular, technology 1
is available only if the investment in R&D is successful. If R&D investment succeeds, the old
technology becomes obsolete. In other words, we assume that the innovation is drastic. 17
The intermediate good sector is assumed to be a monopoly. Monopoly power derives from
intellectual property: the intermediate good rm purchased the relevant patent from the R&D
rm. We assume that the production of the intermediate good rm only uses (inelastically





where a is the activity regulated by the law. We assume a 2 [a;a]; with a > a > 0: For
instance, a can be thought as inversely related to the level of caution used in the production
process. When a is high, the rm is not cautious and, consequently, its marginal cost is low.
15Under this assumption, the indirect utility of the representative agent in the economy has a very simple
form (see Subsection 3.6). This will allow us to obtain closed form solutions for the equilibrium laws in the
two legal regimes. The main thrust of our results, however, does not change in a more general specication.
16In Section 5 we take i to have values i = 0;1;:::;1:
17Innovation is nondrastic if and only if the rm that uses the status-quo technology can make positive
prots when the rm that produces the most advanced technology is charging the monopolistic price. As in
Aghion and Howitt (1992) (Section V) innovations are drastic if A is suciently high.Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 9
To abide by the law, the intermediate good rm must choose the activity level that the law
prescribes. We also assume that a is observable at no cost, so that the law can be perfectly
enforced.18 The price of the intermediate good (relatively to the nal good) is denoted by
p(i):
3.2. Research
The R&D rm chooses how much to invest in research. The amount of investment aects the
probability of discovering the new technology for the intermediate good. Denoting by z the
the amount of investment by the R&D rm, we assume that the new technology is discovered
with probability z; where  > 0 (the probability is equal to one if z > 1=). The patent of
the new technology is sold to a rm in the intermediate good sector. With probability 1 z
there is no innovation and the old technology survives.
3.3. Preferences
The utility of the representative agent of this economy is
u(c(i);a;i) = c(i)   (i)a: (3)
Utility depends linearly on the consumption of the nal good c(i) and, due to a production
externality from the intermediate good rm, on the activity level a. Note that this externality
is reduced if the intermediate good rm is more cautious (that is a is close to a). To motivate
(3) consider the case where the nal good, for instance biscuits, is produced with genetically
modied corn and a is inversely related to amount of regulation in the intermediate good
sector. The emissions of sparks and cinder caused by railroads is another classic example of
externality.19 We assume that (1) = (0) where  > 0: For simplicity, we normalize
(0) to 1. If  > 1; the consumer faces a more dangerous innovation. In this case, the
innovation makes it more costly for the consumer to have a more permissive legislation. If
instead 0 6  < 1, the negative externality from production is less severe under the new
technology.
18We abstract from the enforcement issue in the belief that the type of legal regime has little impact on it.
19See Grady (1988) and Ely (2001) for an account of early cases that addressed these issues. At the end of
the 19th century, for instance, typical allegations of negligence included the failure to have a spark arrester,
to keep it functioning, to use the appropriate type of fuel, to keep the roadway free of weeds, or the failure
to build re guards on the edge of the roadway.Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 10
3.4. The Maximization Problem of the Intermediate Good Firm
We denote by  (a;i) the prot function of the monopolist that produces the intermediate
good according to technology i,
 (a;i) = max
x(i)0
[p(i)   MC (a)]x(i): (4)







That is, p(i) is equal to the marginal product of the intermediate good. The monopolist







After substituting (6) into (4), we obtain








Note that (i) does not depend on the level of activity a, but only on the state of the
technology i. More importantly, notice from (7) that prots are increasing in a.
3.5. Optimal Investment in Research
We assume that the R&D rm that discovers the new technology has all the bargaining power
and can sell its patent for a price equal to  (a;1). Therefore, this rm's optimal choice of z











; (9)Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 11
where, for simplicity, we take the cost of z to be quadratic.20
The optimal choice of z is then:
e z = a(1); (10)
which is increasing in a. The amount of investment e z in (10) is not, in general, socially
optimal because the R&D rm chooses z in order to maximize prots, ignoring consumer
surplus.21
The decision problem of the R&D rm highlights the mechanism through which the law
aects the probability of successful innovation in our model: a pro-business law (which allows
higher levels of activity a) increases the prots of the intermediate good rm and makes
R&D investment more protable, thereby increasing the probability of discovering the more
productive technology.
It is important to notice that in order to determine the amount of R&D investment what
matters is the law the R&D rm expects it will prevail under technology 1. Indeed, the law
that is enforced under the status-quo technology does not enter in (9) and, consequently, does
not aect the decision of the R&D rm.
We are now able to compute the expected rate of output growth of the economy using
(1), (6), (2) and (10):
g = e z












Clearly the more permissive the regulation (the higher is a), the higher the rate of growth in
the economy.22
3.6. Ex-Post Optimal Laws
As discussed above, a can be interpreted as an inverse index of regulatory strictness embodied
in the law. Law-makers are benevolent in the sense that they choose the law in order to
maximize the utility of the representative consumer. In order to solve the legislator's problem,
20Notice that since the probability of successful innovation has constant returns to scale, the number of
rms is indeterminate. Throughout this section, we assume that there is a single R&D rm.
21This is the standard appropriability eect emphasized by the literature on innovation.
22See Gray (1987) for an empirical analysis of the negative consequences of regulation on productivity in
the US manufacturing industry.Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 12
we derive the indirect utility of the representative consumer in each state i. Using (1), (3),
(6) and the equilibrium condition c(i) = y (i), we obtain that the indirect utility is linear in
a:






2   (i) (13)
From (12) note that an increase of a has two eects on utility. First, it has a direct (and
negative) eect due to the externality it creates. The higher (i); the higher is this eect.
Second, a higher a decreases the marginal cost of the intermediate good producer and increases
the production of the nal good. A more pro-business law has then an indirect (and positive)
eect on utility because consumption increases; the higher A(i); the higher the marginal
benet of increasing a due to this second eect. Since A(i) and (i) both depend on i, the
law that optimally solves the trade-o between the two eects is potentially dierent under
the two technologies.
We now compute the law that law-makers would choose ex-post (that is, after observing
the current technological state). We shall refer to this law as the ex-post optimal law and
denote it a(i):23 Given the linearity of (12), it is straightforward to nd for each technological




a if #(i) > 0
a if #(i) < 0
(14)
From (13) notice that #(i) > 0 when A(i); the productivity of the intermediate good, is
relatively high compared to its externality (i). In this case the ex-post optimal law will be
a pro-business law (a law that minimizes the marginal cost of the intermediate good rm).
When instead #(i) < 0; the direct eect of a on consumers' utility is relatively large. In this
case the ex-post optimal law will be punitive for the intermediate good rm.
Throughout the paper we assume that innovation, besides increasing the productivity of
the intermediate good, is welfare-improving. In other words:
23As we will see in Section 4, this law may not coincide with the law that law-makers would choose ex-ante,
when the uncertainty about the technology has not yet been resolved.Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 13
Assumption 1: Innovation increases consumers' utility: #(1) > #(0):
An implication of Assumption 1 is that the ex-post optimal law is weakly increasing in
i. That is, the ex-post optimal law is (weakly) more favorable to the rm producing the
intermediate good after the innovation than before.
As discussed above, the ex-post optimal law is either a or a depending on the value of
A(i) relatively to (i): Notice that if A(0) is suciently low (in relative terms), both a(0)
and a(1) are equal to a: If instead the productivity of the status-quo technology is relatively
high, both a(0) and a(1) are equal to a. A feature common to both cases is that the ex-post
optimal laws under the two technologies coincide. When instead the starting value of A(0)
belongs to an intermediate range, we have that a(0) = a while a(1) = a:
In the early stages of their life cycle, most technologies are likely to be characterized by
low productivity and sizable consequences on consumers' safety. As technologies develop, we
expect productivity to increase and the negative externality on consumers to matter less. As
a result we can postulate the following classication:
Denition 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 is satised. Technology is said to be at an early stage
of development when #(0) < #(1) < 0. This occurs when the productivity of the status-













6 A(0) < 2: (16)
Finally, technology is said to be mature when #(1) > #(0) > 0. This occurs when
A(0) > 2: (17)
It is important to stress that we are not saying that in the early stages technological
innovation is not welfare improving. By Assumption 1 innovation always increases consumers'
utility. Our point is that at early stages considerations concerning consumers' protectionLegal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 14
matter relatively more: that is, the marginal benet from a more permissive law is lower
than its marginal cost. The opposite holds true when technology is mature.
As discussed in the previous section, the probability of a successful innovation depends on
the law that will be enforced if the new technology is discovered. Since innovation is welfare
improving, law-makers want to promote innovation beyond the suboptimal level chosen by
the R&D rm. Law-makers have an eective instrument to promote research: choosing a
pro-business law. This increases the prot of the intermediate good rm, raises the price of
a patent and provides stronger incentives to invest in R&D. The goal of fostering innovation,
however, is not the only goal that law-makers pursue. The law must also optimally regulate
the technological environment. As we will see in the next section, the two goals often do not
coincide.
4. Commitment vs. Flexibility with Endogenous Uncertainty
In this section we nally compare our two legal regimes. First, consider a exible regime
(denoted by F) where the law-maker chooses the law ex-post, after knowing the current state
of the technology. In this case, it is easy to nd out the law that is implemented in each state
i: it coincides with a(i), the ex-post optimal law in that state. Consider next a rigid regime
(denoted by C, for commitment) where the law is chosen ex-ante, before knowing the current
state of the technology. In the rigid regime, law-makers are bound to enforce ex-post the law
that was chosen ex-ante. We crucially assume that in the rigid regime, the law cannot be
made contingent on the technological environment. To justify this, one may assume that the
two environments are dicult to describe ex-ante. However, as is standard in the incomplete
contracting literature, we also assume that law-makers understand how the law aects the
probability of successful innovation and knows the payo consequences of the law in the two
technological states. This assumption is necessary to make the legislator in the rigid regime
able to optimally write the law before uncertainty is realized. Let aC denote the law that will
be enforced under both technologies in the rigid regime.
Notice that, in general, and for dierent reasons, the two legal systems that we have just
described are both bounded away from eciency. On the one hand, the exible regime is
adaptable but it lacks commitment. As a result, it may not provide sucient incentives to
innovate. To see this, assume for instance that we are at an early stage (that is, #(1) < 0).
In this case, the R&D rm correctly foresees that ex-post the law in the 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will be costly for the intermediate good rm. As a result, discovering the new technology
is not very protable. This depresses investment and reduces the probability that welfare-
improving innovation occurs. On the other hand, in the rigid regime the law-maker is able to
commit but is bound to choose a single law and, consequently, he cannot adapt to changing
conditions. The incompleteness of the law is then the source of ineciency of the rigid
regime.
Under the rigid regime, the timing is as follows. First, the legislator chooses the value of
a, say aC: Then, the R&D rm chooses the investment level. Investment is either a success
or a failure. Regardless of the current state of the technology, the intermediate good rm
exerts caution in the amount aC: Finally, the production of the intermediate good and of the
nal good take place. The legislator chooses aC in order to maximize the expected utility of













Notice that ex-ante (before uncertainty is realized) the law has another eect on consumers'
utility, besides the ones discussed in the previous section, it aects the probabilities of the
two technological states. It is then apparent that law-makers have one instrument (namely
aC) to pursue two goals: to provide incentives to innovate and to optimally regulate the new
technological environment. In general, the legislator cannot achieve both goals with a single
instrument and welfare in the rigid regime is then suboptimal.
Under the exible regime, the timing is as follows. First, R&D rms choose how much to
invest. In making this choice, they correctly foresee the choice that law-makers will make ex-
post. Investment is either a success or a failure. Law-makers observe the current technological
environment and have discretion to choose the law. As discussed above, in each state i,
law-makers choose a(i); the law that maximizes consumers' ex-post welfare in that state.
Finally, the production of the intermediate good and of the nal good take place. Welfare in
















Notice that the probability of a successful innovation depends on a(1) because the R&D 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correctly expects a(1) to be enforced in state 1.
4.1. Exogenous Innovation
In comparing the rigid and the exible regimes, it is instructive to begin by considering the
benchmark case where the probability of successful innovation is exogenous. Let  denote the
probability that innovation occurs.
When technological innovation is exogenous, the law cannot (obviously) provide incentives
to innovate. Therefore, legal systems dier only with respect to their ability to choose the
best law for each technology. Given this premise, it is entirely straightforward to conclude
that when innovation is exogenous the exible regime weakly dominates the rigid one. The
two regimes are equivalent only in two cases: when there is no uncertainty and when the
ex-post optimal laws are the same under both technologies.24 This occurs because in both
instances the incompleteness constraint is not binding.
Let Wj() denote maximized welfare when the probability of innovation is equal to ,
where j = C;F: We state the following without proof.
Proposition 1. Exogenous Innovation: When technology is either at an early stage or is
mature, for all  2 [0;1] we have WF() = WC(): When instead technology is at an interme-
diate stage, WF() > WC() for all  2 (0;1) and WF() = WC() when  = 0;1:
It is instructive to compute WF() and WC() when technology is at an intermediate stage.
This is clearly the most interesting case since when the signs of #(0) and #(1) coincide, we
know from Proposition 1 that the two legal systems yield the same outcomes. Recall that in
the exible regime law-makers choose ex-post the optimal laws (14), we then have
WF() = a#(1) + (1   )a#(0): (20)
Consider now the rigid regime. It is easy to verify that in the rigid regime the legislator
chooses a (resp. a) when  is below (resp. above) a certain threshold. To understand this
result, recall that the legislator must choose a single (non-contingent) law. Therefore, he
will choose the law that better regulates the status-quo technology (which is equal to a; when
24The latter possibility arises when the economy is at an early or at an advanced stage of developmentAnderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 17
technology is at an intermediate stage) if and only if successful innovation is not very likely.
One can verify that this threshold, which is denoted by ; is given by
 =
(a   a)#(0)





a#(1) + (1   )a#(0) if  6 
a#(1) + (1   )a#(0) otherwise
(22)
In Figure 1 below, we draw (20) and (22). Both WF() and WC() are increasing in  by
Assumption 1. It is important to notice that the welfare loss of the rigid regime vis- a-vis
the exible one is relatively large for intermediate values of . In this region of parameters it
is relatively more costly to have an non-contingent law (the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the incompleteness constraint is high). The convexity of WC() helps explain why in a
model where R&D investment is endogenous, the legislator in the rigid regime may have an







Figure 1: Welfare levels with exogenous innovation for #(0) < 0 < #(1).Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 18
4.2. Endogenous R&D investment
When R&D investment is endogenously chosen, the probability of discovering the new tech-
nology depends on the law. This assumption has two important implications. First, it does
matter now whether or not law-makers are able to commit. Credibility problems arise be-
cause the rst order conditions in the ex-ante problem (before R&D investment is chosen)
and in the ex-post problem (after knowing whether R&D investment was a success) dier.
This is because at the ex-ante stage law-makers do take into account the eect of the law
on the incentives to invest | see (10) above | but do not do so at the ex-post stage. In
other words, because of credibility problems, in some cases committing to a rule (choosing the
rigid regime) is preferable to leaving ex-post discretion to law-makers (choosing the exible
regime). A second implication is that the legislator in the rigid regime may now have an
incentive to select a rule that reduces the underlying uncertainty in the economy. As shown
below, this result can be achieved by either strongly encouraging or strongly discouraging
R&D investment.






C [#(1)   #(0)]: (23)
Notice that, by Assumption 1, #(1)   #(0) > 0: The objective function is then convex in
aC. This implies that (23) yields a bang-bang solution: the chosen law aC is either a or a. As






#(1) #(0) + 2(1)(a + a) > 0
a otherwise
(24)
We now discuss the optimal law chosen by the legislator in each of the three stages of
technological development.
Mature stage. When #(0) > 0; using (24) we obtain aC = a:25 Choosing law a achieves
two goals at the same time: it provides the right incentive to conduct research and it optimally
25Indeed, from (23), welfare in the rigid regime is increasing in aC when #(0) > 0:Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 19
regulates the two technological environments we may observe ex post.
Intermediate Stage. As always, the goal of favoring innovation is achieved by selecting a:
However, when technology is at an intermediate stage, a is ex-post optimal when innovation
is successful but is suboptimal when innovation is not successful. As from (24) the legislator
chooses a when #(1) #(0) is small and, consequently, it is not valuable to provide incentives
to innovate. We also expect a to be selected when #(0) << 0. In this case, it would be too
risky to choose a: A pro-business law is extremely inecient if the new intermediate good is
not discovered. Finally, if the probability of a successful innovation can be made suciently
close to 1, then the choice a dominates.






Figure 2: Utility of the representative consumer in the rigid regime when #(1) and #(0) < 0
Early Stage. In this environment providing incentives (choosing a) is suboptimal when
R&D investment fails but also when it succeeds. However, (24) implies that in some cases
the legislator will select a: To understand why consider Figure 2 above. It depicts the indirect
utility of the representative consumer, which was dened in (12), as a function of the law for
both technological states. Given that #(0) and #(1) negative, both utilities are decreasingLegal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 20
in the law, a. Points A and B (resp. points C and D) indicate the agent's utility associated
to law a (resp. a) in state 1 and 0. Since at this technological stage we have that in both
states law a is ex-post optimal, from a welfare view point A dominates C and B dominates
D. However, to see why the legislator may sometimes choose a notice that, from (18), even
if A dominates C and B dominates D, the weighted sum of A and B may be smaller than
the weighted sum of C and D, since the weights are endogenous. This may occur when the
choice a raises the probability of state 1 by a considerable amount.26
After deriving the laws that are enforced in the two regimes, it is straightforward to
compare the two legal institutions. Proposition 2 establishes that, in contrast to Section 3,
when R&D investments are endogenous the exible regime is not necessarily optimal in all
circumstances. In particular, when technology is at an early stage we have that the rigid
regime may actually dominate the exible regime because of its ability to provide better
incentives to innovate. At the early stages of technological development the exible regime
selects a law that protects public safety and provides weak incentives to innovate. Moreover,
by choosing aC = a the legislator in the rigid regime can achieve the same welfare that
is obtained in the exible regime. Hence, the legislator might choose aC > a in order to
provide incentives to innovate. This possibility is not available in the exible regime and
this explains why we obtain that the commitment regime weakly dominates the exible one.
When technology is mature, the two systems yield the same outcomes. Finally, in economies
at an intermediate stages of development | periods when legal change is needed and there are
no commitment problems | the exible regime is strictly better than the rigid one because
of its ability to choose the best law for each technology.
Let gi; with i = F;C; denote the rate of output growth under legal regime i: The next
proposition states the main result of this section.
Proposition 2. Welfare Comparison: (i) When technology is mature, we have that WC =
WF and gC = gF:(ii) When technology is at an intermediate stage of development, we have
that WC < WF and gC 6 gF:(iii) When technology is at an early stage of development, we
have that WC > WF and gC > gF:
A natural question is whether the theoretical predictions of Proposition 2 are validated
26Notice that a necessary condition to choose a is to have a#(1) > a#(0): In Figure 2 this implies that
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by the data. While a full investigation is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper, we
pause to point out that such an empirical analysis would have to overcome several challenging
obstacles. To begin with, one would need cross-country historical data on technological inno-
vation. Moreover, in order to empirically distinguish among the three stages of technological
development discussed in this paper, one would need measures of (possibly, industry-level)
productivity and also measures of the externality caused by technological innovation.27
4.3. Rigidity and Overinvestment
As a benchmark, we now dene and derive the law in the rst-best environment. Similarly to
the exible regime, the rst-best law species a law for each technological environment and,
similarly to the rigid regime, the rst-best law is specied ex ante under full commitment.
Let aFB
i denote the rst-best law that will be enforced under technology i = 0;1: Welfare in
























To compute the rst-best law, rst notice that aFB
0 has no eect on the amount of R&D
investment. Then, we have that aFB
0 is equal to a(0), the ex-post optimal law in state 0: To
nd aFB
1 ; two cases must be considered. First, assume that #(1) > 0: In this case, we have
that aFB
1 = a(1) = a: To see this, notice that this choice of law fosters innovation and at the
same time optimally regulates the more advanced technological environment. Second, when
#(1) < 0, it is immediate to verify that the objective is concave in aFB
1 on the interval [a;a]:
Therefore, to nd aFB
1 we have to study the sign of the derivative at a and a: We obtain that
aFB
1 = a if and only if 2#(1)   #(0) 6 0, while aFB
1 = a if and only if 2a#(1)   a#(0) > 0: In
the remaining cases, aFB
1 is an interior solution: The interpretation is quite straightforward.
When #(1) < 0 and #(1)   #(0) is small, innovation does not increase welfare by much and,
consequently, aFB
1 coincides with a; the ex-post optimal law at this stage:
In what follows, we compare the probability of a successful innovation under the rst-best
law with the one obtained under the rigid and the exible regimes. Surprisingly, we nd that
27A useful starting point might be the dataset on technology adoption compiled by Comin and Hobijin
(2004). They classify technologies according to whether they have a previous competing technology. Whether
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in some cases aC > aFB
1 : This implies that in the rigid regime there may be overinvestment
in R&D (hence, too much growth) compared to what would be socially optimal.28
It is easy to verify that the possibility of overinvestment occurs only when technology
is at the early stage.29 At this stage, two reasons push the legislator in the rigid regime
to choose a pro-business law: to increase the probability that welfare improving innovation
occurs and to reduce the probability of staying with the status-quo technology and suering
from inecient regulation. Notice in fact that at an early stage a high aC is always suboptimal
but is relatively more inecient under the old than under the new technology (see Figure
2 which shows that C > D). In the rst-best problem, the second reason is not present
because the law is state-contingent and, consequently, the status-quo technology is optimally
regulated. This is why rigid legal system may induce overinvestment in R&D compared to
the optimal level.
As summarized in the following proposition, in the rigid legal regime we may have either
overinvestment (if aC = a while aFB
1 < a) or underinvestment (when aC = a while aFB
1 > a):
In the exible legal regime investment is never larger than the ecient one.
Proposition 3. The Possibility of Overinvestment: The rate of output growth in the ex-
ible regime is always smaller or equal than rst-best. In the early stage of technological
development, economies adopting the rigid regime may grow faster than rst-best.
At rst glance, it may seem paradoxical that the rate of output growth in the rigid regime
may be ineciently high. However, recall that welfare depends on the consumption of nal
good but also on the activity level of the intermediate good rm. A high rate of growth
may be suboptimal when it is obtained by committing to a high a; which implies a low use
of precaution in the intermediate good sector.
4.4. Costly Change of the Law
We now assume that the law in the rigid regime can be changed by incurring an exogenous
cost  > 0 after knowing which technology is available. Let WC() denote welfare in the
28Usually, the literature on incomplete contracts has focused on the possibility of underinvestment due to
ex-post exploitation (see Grout, 1984). The overinvestment result is also obtained in the incomplete contract
literature: see for instance, Chung (1995). The underlying reason is somewhat dierent from ours: in that
literature, some parties may overinvest to strategically aect their bargaining power ex-post.
29When instead #(1) > 0 we obtained aFB
1 = a: Then, it is not possible to observe aC > aFB
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rigid regime when the cost of changing the statute is equal to : Clearly, WC(1) = WC and
WC(0) = WF where WC and WF are dened in (18) and (19) above, respectively.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning, the legislator selects the law aC. The R&D
rm chooses the amount of investment. In making this decision the R&D rm understands
the legislator's incentives to change the law ex-post. After knowing the current technological
environment, the legislator decides whether to enforce the existing law aC or to change it by
incurring the cost . Finally, production and consumption take place.
We obtain two key results. First, we show that for all  > 0 the possibility of changing the
statute does not alter the welfare rankings that we have established in Proposition 2 above.
Second, we show that WC() varies (in a possibly non-monotonic way) with :
Proposition 4. Costly Change: (i) When technology is mature, WC() is constant in  and
for all  > 0 we have WC() = WF; (ii) When technology is at an intermediate stage, WC()
is decreasing in  and for all  > 0 we have WC() < WF: (iii) When technology is at an
early stage, WC() is not necessarily monotone in  and for all  > 0 we have WC() > WF:
To understand part (i) of Proposition 4, notice that when technology is mature both
legal regimes attain the rst-best by selecting a: Since it is never optimal to change the law
ex-post,  does not aect welfare. When technology is at an intermediate stage, exibility
is needed and a pro-business law is also credible: the rigid regime would then benet from
a low . As long as  is strictly positive, however, the exible regime remains superior. In
the early stage, WC() weakly dominates the exible regime because the rigid regime has the
possibility of selecting a and reproducing the exible regime.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 also states that in the early stage of technological development,
WC() may not be monotone in : In particular, for some nite  it may happen that
WC() > WC(1) > WC(0): (26)
In other words, choosing a positive, but nite, cost of changing the law would further improve
welfare in the rigid regime. The second inequality in (26) follows from part (iii) of Proposition
2. We now prove that the rst inequality is veried for some parameter values. For instance,
assume that when  = 1 the parameters in (24) are such that the optimal law in the fullyLegal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 24
rigid regime is a: Moreover, pick a  that satises the following two inequalities:30
#(0)a <   + #(0)a; (27)
#(1)a >   + #(1)a: (28)
This partially rigid legal system provides credible incentives to innovate since inequality (28)
establishes that a is not changed ex-post in state 1. Moreover, given that  satises (27), the
law a will be changed ex-post in the case innovation fails (an event occurring with strictly
positive probability). This indicates that an intermediate value of  would provide exibility
and also commitment. Therefore, it would be preferable to having either  = 1 or  = 0:
5. The Dynamic Model
We now consider a dynamic model. We assume that time, which is indexed by t > 0,
is continuous and unbounded. Moreover, we postulate that the number of feasible inno-
vations is innite. In other words, technological progress never settles. Let i denote the
current technological state. The productivity of the intermediate good increases as follows:
A(i + 1) = AA(i), with A > 1: As before, we assume that innovations are drastic: if the
more productive intermediate good i+1 is discovered, the intermediate good i becomes obso-
lete. Flow production of consumption good is given by (1). To simplify the algebra, we assume
that the externality from the intermediate good sector is constant: (i + 1) = (i) = :





 rt (ct   at)dt; (29)
where r is the constant rate of time preference, also equal to the interest rate.31 We denote
by ct and at the time-t consumption and intermediate good producer's activity, respectively.
Flow consumption at time t is stochastic since it depends on the technological state that is
30By looking at Figure 2, it is easy to see that such a  always exists. Just notice that #(0)a corresponds
to point D; #(0)a to point B; #(1)a to point C and #(1)a to point A: A value of  that satises (27) and
(28) always exists because B   D > A   C:
31This is because the marginal utility of consumption is constant. The linearity of the utility removes any
incentive to either save or borrow for consumption-smoothing or risk-sharing purposes. Then, c(i) = y (i):Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 25
available at that time: The economy is similar to the one analyzed in Section 3. As above,
marginal cost is aected by the law according to equation (2).
Using (1), (3), (6) and the equilibrium condition c(i) = y (i), we obtain that when the








A   ; (30)
and ai is the law which is enforced under technology i:
As in Section 3, innovation is welfare improving. Indeed, #(i + 1) > #(i). It is also
important to notice that in the long-run, after a possibly long sequence of innovations, #(i)
will become positive and, consequently, a will be the ex-post optimal law. Let N > 0
denote the lowest technological state where #(i) is weakly positive: that is, #(N) > 0 but
#(N   1) < 0: (N = 0 if the initial A(0) is suciently high and  is suciently low).
The innovation process is assumed to be a continuous time Markov Chain, as in Aghion
and Howitt (1992). The economy moves through a sequence of states 0 ! 1 ! ::: staying
with innovation k for a sojourn time Xk with density z(k+1)e z(k+1), where z(k+1) are the
R&D expenditures that are incurred in order to discover the intermediate product of quality
k + 1:32 We assume 0 6 z(k + 1) < 1:
Throughout this section, the term transition will denote the interval of time from 0 to
the time when innovation N is discovered. Knowing the equilibrium investment levels, we







From (31) it is clear that transition is fast when R&D expenditures and  are high and when
N is small.
In the dynamic model, the intermediate good rm owns a life-time patent. However, since
innovations are assumed to be drastic, the intermediate good rm stops making prots as
soon as a more advanced technology is discovered. Hence, the value of the patent of invention
32This stochastic process is known in the statistical literature as a pure birth process. See Feller (1966).
Notice that a pure birth process is a generalization of a Poisson process in which the arrival rate is not




r + z(i + 1)
: (32)
This is the expected present value of the ow of monopoly prots  (ai;i) generated by the
i-product over an interval of time that is exponentially distributed with parameter z(i+1):
Notice that (i) is decreasing in future R&D expenditures, since higher values for z(i + 1)
shortens the expected tenure of the monopolist producing the i-intermediate product. In
deriving (32) we assume perfect foresight: at each t all agents correctly foresee the R&D
expenditures that will be incurred and the laws that will be enforced in all subsequent tech-
nological environments.
As before, we consider two legal regimes. In the exible regime, at any instant courts and
regulators select the ex-post optimal law.33 Notice that the law enforced in the exible regime
does not depend on t; but only on i: This occurs because the trade-o that law-makers face
only depends on i: In the rigid regime, the law aC is chosen at t = 0 and is never changed.
In this case, regardless of the current technological state and of the current time, courts and
regulators are bound to enforce aC:
Since innovations increase the productivity of the intermediate good, we have from (7)
that prots  (ai;i) are increasing in i. This implies that over time R&D rms have stronger














(i + 1) = !
(i), with ! > 1: That is, we implicitly assume that the cost of hiring
researchers is increasing as technology matures (possibly due to increasing wages). Therefore,
the optimal amount of R&D investment needed to discover the intermediate good i, where




(i)(r + e z(i + 1))
: (34)
Since e z(i) is strictly decreasing in e z(i + 1); (34) clearly illustrates the negative dependency
between current and future research. It is also important to notice that R&D investment
for the ith invention depends on future laws. The mechanism through which this occurs is
33This is because even in this dynamic model law-makers in the exible regime solve a static problem since
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twofold. On the one hand, the law that is enforced in the technological state i aects ow
prots; on the other hand, the law that regulates the technological state i + 1 changes the
expected duration of the monopoly for the intermediate good rm:
We now make the following assumption in order to have closed form solutions for maxi-
mized welfare in the rigid regime.
Assumption 2: Let ! = 2
A.
Under Assumption 2, using (7) and the laws of motion of 
(i) and A(i), it is immediate that
the ratio between (a;i) and 
(i) is constant for all i.
5.1. Dynamics: Rigid Regime
We now characterize the rigid regime. For any given law aC; we identify the equilibrium R&D
investment for innovation i. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992), there exist many sequences
fe z(i)g
1
i=1 satisfying (34). Among these we focus on the unique stationary equilibrium. Using







One can verify that z is increasing in aC and A(0) and decreasing in 
(0):
In our stationary equilibrium, the expected number of innovations per unit interval is then
constant and equal to z: Moreover, the probability that there will be exactly i innovations





In other words, in a stationary equilibrium the number of innovations up to time t is a random
variable following a Poisson distribution of constant rate z:












































Notice that the law aC enters (39) twice. The law has a direct eect on welfare: it multiplies
the term in square brackets. Also, the law has an indirect eect through z; in particular,
recall that z is increasing in aC.34
Next, we identify the optimal law in the rigid regime. It is obvious that when #(0) > 0;
the legislator will choose aC = a since this law is ex-post optimal for all i: When #(0) < 0 the
trade-o is less trivial: choosing a pro-business law is costly along the transition but optimal
in the long-run. We can show (see the proof of Proposition 5 in the Appendix) that if 2
A > 2
the objective in (38) is convex in aC. In the remainder of this paper, we assume that this
condition is met.35 As in the static model, we obtain a bang-bang solution: aC is either a or
a.
The next proposition provides sucient conditions that guarantee that the law in the
rigid regime is equal to a:
Proposition 5: (Rigid Regime: Dynamic Model) The law in the rigid regime is equal to a
when either , or A or A(0) is suciently high.
The intuition why, when A and  are suciently high, the legislator selects a is the following.
First, high values of A and  give the legislator more incentives to use the law to increase
R&D investment. Second, when A and  are high, the transition will likely be short.
It is important to emphasize that the fact that the speed of technological change is endoge-
nous gives the legislator an additional incentive to choose a pro-business law. By providing
strong incentives to innovate the length of the transition becomes shorter, thereby reducing






z(aC) > 0. If this is not the case, criteria for evaluating innite utility streams (such as the
over-taking criterion) must be used.
35This condition, which is sucient but not necessary for the objective in (38) to be convex, is defendable
in the context of our model: a low A might be inconsistent with the assumption that innovations are drastic.
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the cost of committing, via a rigid statute, to a pro-business law. As in Subsection 4.3, this
suggests that rigid regimes may sometimes grow at a rate greater than the optimal one.
Finally, from (39) it is also intuitive that the lower A(0), the weaker the incentives to
choose a pro-business law: The reason is simply that if the initial productivity is low, the
transition from state 0 to state N is longer.
5.2. Dynamics: Flexible Regime
Consider now the exible regime. In contrast to the commitment regime, the enforced law in
the exible regime depends on the current technological state. In particular, the law is a for
all i > N and a for all i < N:
Knowing the laws that are enforced for all i, we can determine e z(i) using (34). We
proceed backwards. For all i > N we solve for the stationary solution which solves (35) from
N onwards, where in (35) aC is replaced by a. Next, we determine e z(N   1): We expect
e z(N   1) to be low. The reason is twofold. First, R&D investment for invention N   1 is
low because the law that is enforced in the case invention N   1 occurs is equal to a; which
is costly for the intermediate good rm. The second reason for the lower investment in this
state is that the monopoly power of the producer of the N  1 intermediate good is expected
to be short-lived. This is because the law in state N will be a and, consequently, the R&D
investment for innovation N is expected to be high.36 Knowing e z(N   1) and proceeding
backwards one can then compute all expenditures in R&D along the transition.
In Figure 3 below, we compute and draw for specic parameter values the sequence
fe z(i)g
1
i=0. Notice that R&D investment is constant for all i > N.37 In the transition, we
observe innovation cycles: low innovation when i is odd stimulates innovation when i is even.
As discussed above, the research investment for product N   1 is especially low.

















36This suggests that growth in the exible regime may slow down exactly before taking o. A similar
\no-growth trap" has been derived in Aghion and Howitt (1992).
37In Figure 3 we obtain N = 8:Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 30
Figure 3: R&D Investment in the Flexible Regime




and for i > 1






For example, solving the above recursive relation we obtain (assuming that e z(1) is dierent
from e z(2))
P1(t) = e z(1)

1









which shows, for instance that P1(t) is low if e z(2) is high and/or e z(1) is low.38
5.3. Discussion
We start comparing the speed of technological change in the two legal systems.39 Two cases
need to be considered in the rigid regime: when aC is a and when aC is a:40 First, assume
38For the derivation of (41), (42) and (43), see, for instance, Karlin and Taylor (1975, p. 121) and Feller
(1966, p. 41).
39As discussed above, for each legal regime we picked the equilibrium in which the economy eventually
moves to a balanced growth path, where all expected rates of growth are constant.
40Recall that we assumed that 2
A > 2. Then, the objective in (38) is convex.Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 31
that parameters are such that the law in the rigid regime is a. In this case, the rate of output
growth in the rigid regime will be greater than in the exible one. If instead the rigid regime
chooses a, comparing the rates of output growth during the transition is not straightforward.
To see this, look at Figure 3, which shows that along the transition R&D investment in the
exible regime oscillates above and below the level of investment that is observed in the rigid
regime when a is chosen. However, as soon as invention N is discovered, we would have that
in the exible regime the enforced law will switch to a and the economy without commitment
will grow at a faster pace.
We now develop some intuition as to some of the main parameters that impact the welfare
comparison between the two regimes. For instance, we expect the exible legal system to be
dominated when a is close to zero and when either  or A is large. To see this, recall that
in the exible regime a is chosen during the transition. Moreover, note that when a is close
to zero, ow prots are also close to zero. This reduces R&D investment and lengthens the
transition in the exible regime. On the other hand, when either  or A is large, the rigid
regime undergoes a rapid transition when aC is set to a, thereby reducing the static welfare
losses of choosing a when i is less than N.
Along the same lines, when N is high the rigid regime is likely to dominate. In this case,
in fact, credibility problems are more serious and commitment more desirable. Provided that
either  or A is suciently large, the legislator in the rigid regime selects a, which speeds up
the transition and make the lack of exibility of the rigid regime less costly.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigates whether a exible legal system is preferable to a rigid system in
keeping up with technological progress. To answer this question we developed a simple
model of endogenous technological change where innovations are vertical (and new products
provide greater quality and replace existing ones) and we analyze the two legal regimes.
We argue that the comparison between the two institutions involves a trade-o between
commitment and exibility. In this paper, this trade-o is is far from trivial since the degree
of uncertainty, which is a key parameter in the comparison, is not exogenous, as in the
rules-versus-discretion literature, but depends on R&D rms' investment decisions, which
are endogenous to the model.Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 32
In the context of a model with only two technological states, we show that rigid legal
systems are preferable (in terms of welfare and rate of output growth) in the early stages of
technological development. In the intermediate stages we obtain that exible legal systems
are preferable: output grows faster and welfare is greater. Finally, when technology is mature,
the two legal systems are shown to be equivalent.
The amount of innovation in the rigid regime may be either ineciently low or, under
some conditions, ineciently high.
The welfare comparison summarized above holds even when we assume that in the rigid
regime the statute (or regulation) can be changed ex-post at a cost.
We then extend our analysis to a model where technology undergoes continuous change,
we show that similar results to the ones obtained in the simple setting with only two tech-
nologies hold. In the stationary equilibrium of the rigid regime we show that the speed of
technological change is either very low or very high. In the exible regime, we nd that
because of commitment problems technological change is relatively slow in the early stages
of technological development.
A natural question would be how our conclusions would change in an economy where
R&D investment increases the variety of available goods (for instance as in Romer, 1990).
Various results obtained in the current setting would likely survive. However, we expect the
legislator in a rigid regime (where the law is not contingent on each variety) to discourage
innovation, but not to induce overinvestment. Indeed, contrary to our conclusions, horizontal
innovations always increase the complexity of the economy since new varieties coexist with
old varieties. Therefore, the legislator in the rigid regime would likely have a bias against
such innovations. Everything else being equal, we expect the rigid regime to grow at a slower
pace than in the setting we have analyzed here.Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 33
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: i) Using Denition 1, when technology is mature we have that #(0) > 0 and
#(1) > 0. In the exible regime, we know from (14) that law-makers select a in both states. In the rigid
regime, from (24) we conclude that aC = a. This implies that welfare in the two regimes is the same and that
gC = gF:
ii) Suppose now that technology is at an intermediate stage, as dened in Subsection 3.6. In the exible
regime, from (14) we conclude that the law enforced in state 1 (resp. 0) is a (resp. a). In the rigid regime,
using (24) we know that aC is either a or a: First, assume that aC = a: Given (10), this implies that the
probability that state 1 occurs in the rigid regime is lower than in the exible one. Consequently, from (11)
we have that gF > gC: Moreover, we also obtain that WF > WC. The reason is twofold: because a does not
maximize u(a;1) and because state 1 (which by Assumption 1 provides greater utility than state 0) is more
likely in the exible regime. Second, assume that aC = a: In this case, the probability that state 1 occurs
in the two regimes is the same: then, gF = gC: Since we assumed an interior solution for R&D investment,
the probability that state 1 occurs is strictly smaller than one: Then, with some positive probability state 0
occurs. Since a does not maximize u(a;0); this implies that when aC = a we also have that WF > WC:
iii) When technology is at an early stage, using (14) we obtain that the ex-post optimal law is a in both
states so that the exible regime provides weak incentives to innovate. Since the rigid regime can replicate
the exible one by choosing aC = a and since the rigid regime can also choose aC = a, it must be the case
that WC > WF and gC > gF:
Proof of Proposition 3: We derive aFB
0 and aFB
1 . Since aFB
0 does not aect the amount of R&D




a if #(0) < 0
a if #(0) > 0
(A.1)
To nd aFB
1 two cases must be considered. First, assume that #(1) > 0: In this case aFB
1 is obviously
equal to a: Second, assume #(1) < 0: In this case, since the second derivative is 2#(1); the objective is concave
in aFB






a if 2a#(1)   aFB(0)#(0) > 0





To show that R&D investment in the exible regime cannot be larger than the one under the rst-best
law, we must show that a(1) 6 aFB
1 : Two cases are possible. When #(1) > 0 in the exible regime as
well as under the rst-best law we have that the law for the more advanced technology is equal to a, so thatLegal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 34
investment in the exible regime is identical to the rst-best level. When #(1) < 0; law-makers in the exible
regime choose a. The rate of growth under the rst-best can only be larger than gF.
In order to prove that the commitment regime may induce overinvestment in research, we must show
that there exists a region of parameter values where aC = a and at the same time aFB
1 < a: To show this,
assume that #(1) < 0: (When #(1) > 0 innovation in the rst-best is already at the maximum level and the
commitment regime can at most grow at the same rate). Moreover, consider the following parameter values:
take a = 1 and 2(1) = 1 so that if the law is a, state 1 occurs with probability one. In this case, we have
WC = max
aC2[a;a]
(1   aC)#(0)aC + aC#(1)aC: (A.3)










One can verify that when #(0) < 2#(1) it is always possible to nd a value for a; with 0 < a < 1; such that
both (A.4) and (A.5) are satised, which proves our claim that at least for some parameter values the rigid
regime induces overinvestment. Note that since (A.4) and (A.5) are strict inequalities, the same argument
would also go through if 2(1) is strictly below but suciently close to one so that, as we assumed in the
paper, the probability of state 1 is strictly lower than one.
Proof of Proposition 4: We introduce some notation. Let aC() denote the law that is initially chosen
in the partially rigid regime. Moreover, we denote by a(i;;aC()) the law that is chosen ex-post in state i
given that the cost of changing the law is  and that aC() was initially chosen.
i) When A(0) > 2, it is immediate to verify that aC() = a for all : Moreover, for i = 1;2, we have
a(i;;a) = a: Welfare in the rigid regime does not depend on  since the law is never changed ex-post. Then
we have that WC() = WC(0) = WF for all :
ii) Suppose now that technology is at an intermediate stage, as dened in Subsection 3.6. In this case,
for all  and all aC() 2 [a;a] we have that
a(1;;aC()) =
(





It is easy to verify that at this stage (since #(1) > 0) for any given aC() we have that a(1;;aC()) is
weakly decreasing in : Next, we dene the following expressions:Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 35







f W0(;aC()) = maxf#(0)aC;  + maxa0#(0)a0g: (A.8)
It can be shown that for a given aC(); both f W0(;aC()) and f W1(;aC()) are weakly decreasing in :






f W1(;aC())   f W0(;aC())
i
+ f W0(;aC()) (A.9)
We now show that for all 00 > 0 > 0; we have that WC(00) 6 WC(0): To see this, note that
WC(0) > 2(1)a(1;0;aC(00))
h









The rst inequality follows from the fact that aC(0) is the optimal strategy when the cost is 0. Hence
it cannot provide less utility than choosing aC(00): To understand the second inequality, just recall that for
a given law aC(), we have that a(1;;aC()); f W1(;aC()) and f W0(;aC()) are all weakly decreasing in .
We now show that for all  > 0 we have WC() < WF: Consider any  > 0: Two cases are possible:
aC() = a or aC() < a:
First, assume that aC() = a: In this case, a(1;;aC()) = a and the probability that state 1 occurs when
 = 0 and when  > 0 is the same: (Recall in fact that when  = 0 we have a(1;0;aC(0)) = a) Then, when
aC() = a we obtain that f W1(0;aC(0)) = f W1(;a): However, since in state 0, a is suboptimal, we also have
that f W0(0;aC(0)) > f W0(;a): Since the probability that state 0 occurs is assumed to be strictly positive,
from (A.9) we conclude that WC() < WC(0) = WF:
Second, assume that aC() < a: Two further cases are possible: either a(1;;aC()) = a or a(1;;aC()) <
a: In the former case, the probabilities of state 1 occurring is the same when  = 0 and when  > 0: However,
it must be that f W0(0;aC(0)) > f W0(;aC()) and, because the law is changed in state 1; f W1(0;aC(0)) >
f W1(;aC()): This implies that WC() < WF: Second, assume that we have that a(1;;aC()) < a: Then,
f W1(0;aC(0)) > f W1(;aC()): Moreover, the probability that state 1 occurs when  = 0 is strictly greater
than the same probability when  > 0: Then, we also have that WC() < WF:
iii) When technology is at an early stage the ex-post optimal law is always a so that the exible regime
does not provide any incentive to innovate. The rigid regime, on the contrary, can choose to provide incentives.Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 36
Therefore, exactly as in case iii) of Proposition 2, the rigid regime could replicate the exible one by picking
a, so that it must be the case that WC() > WF: We refer to the main text (see Section 4.4) for an example
that shows that WC() may not be monotone in  when technology is at the early stage:













and z(aC) is obtained using (35).
Step 1: A sucient (but not necessary) condition to insure that the objective in problem (A.10) is convex
is that 2
A > 2:



















z00(aC)(r   z(aC)) + 2(z0(aC))2
(r   z(aC))
3 (A.13)
Given that in order for welfare to have an upper bound, we assumed r   z(aC) > 0 for all laws, we obtain
that f00(aC) > 0 if and only if
z00(aC)(r   z(aC)) + 2(z0(aC))2 > 0: (A.14)
After obtaining z0(aC) and z00(aC) from equation (35), inequality (A.14) can be written (after denoting A(0)
and 




















2 (r   z(aC)) > 0: (A.15)
After some algebra, it can be shown that a sucient condition to have (A.15) strictly positive is that 2
A > 2:
Step 2: If 2
A > 2; the law in the rigid regime is equal to a when ;A and #(0) are suciently high.Anderlini, Felli, Immordino, and Riboni 37
Proof: First, note that given that the objective in (A.10) is convex, a sucient condition to insure that









Since z(a) does not depend on A, it is easy to verify that when A is suciently large, (A.16) is satised.
Therefore, the solution of problem (39) is aC = a: After verifying that z(aC) is increasing in  and A(0), a
similar argument is used to show that when either  or A(0) are suciently high, we have aC = a:Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth 38
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